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1 
Chinese Bilateral Judgment Enforcement 
Treaties 
KING FUNG TSANG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral judgment enforcement treaties entered into between China 
and foreign countries (hereinafter bilateral treaties) are still very much a 
mystery after three decades in use.1 There are two official ways for a 
foreign judgment to be enforced in China,2 either through “reciprocity” 
or through a bilateral treaty.3 Commentators have suffered from a number 
of misconceptions about bilateral treaties. These misconceptions range 
from regarding bilateral treaties as unimportant,4 overgeneralizing the 
 
*King Fung Tsang, Assistant Professor, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, LL.M., J.D. 
(Columbia), S.J.D. (Georgetown). 
        1.    The first enforcement treaty entered into by China was the Judicial Assistance Treaty in 
Civil and Commercial Affairs, May 4, 1987. 
 2. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by President of 
the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991, effective 2012) arts. 281-82(China) (hereinafter, 
Civil Procedure Law). 
 3. It is possible to argue that there are two more ways to recognize or enforce foreign 
judgments. First, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan all have entered into specific enforcement 
arrangements. However, due to their respective unique status within China’s legal system, it is clear 
that none of these arrangements are regarded as treaties. Second, for the recognition of foreign 
divorce judgment, it will be recognized unless (1) it is not legally effective, (2) the judgment 
rendering state does not have jurisdiction, (3) the defendant was not properly summoned and absent 
from the proceedings, (4) there is a parallel proceeding on the same divorce case in China; the 
Chinese court has already made a judgment on the same case; or China has already recognized a 
third country judgment on the same case, or (5) the foreign judgment was contrary to the basic legal 
principles of China, sovereignty, security or public order. See Supreme People’s Court, Opinions 
on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce 
Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, 64 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO 61 (2000) (Chinese 
text). Ironically, despite both technically falling into the “reciprocity” branch, the Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan arrangements are closer to the bilateral treaties, while the recognition of foreign 
divorce judgments does not require reciprocity. See Supreme People’s Court, Interpretation of the 
SPC on the Application of the PRC Civil Procedure Law art. 544 (2015), www.ipkey.org/en/ip-
law-document/download/2649/3380/23 (hereinafter 2015 Interpretation). 
 4. Duelling with Dragons: Managing Business Disputes in Today’s China (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.jurisconferences.com/2011/duelling-with-dragons-managing-business-disputes-in-
todays-china-september-20-2011/. (“Unfortunately, the [bilateral treaties] are of limited application 
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similarities between them5 or confusing them with “reciprocity.”6 
Moreover, there has been little discussion on their effectiveness, despite 
the fact that these bilateral treaties serve as the best available precedents 
for China in her consideration on whether to enter into multinational 
enforcement conventions, such as the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements7 (hereinafter Hague Convention). It can be noted that 
few commentators have ever made the comparison between the proposed 
Hague Convention and the bilateral treaties.8 
This article seeks to establish a true understanding of bilateral 
treaties through an empirical survey of the 33 bilateral treaties of judicial 
assistance China has entered into with foreign countries, the relevant 
judicial cases, and government data relating to them. From the facts 
obtained through this survey, it is argued that these treaties deserve much 
more attention than they currently receive and efforts should be exerted 
to understand them properly. While this article cannot realistically 
resolve all the uncertainties surrounding bilateral treaties, it can strive to 
identify the right issues that demand further attention from courts and 
scholars in the future. Finally, the article will discuss how these existing 
bilateral treaties will have a bearing on whether China will enter into the 
Hague Convention. 
Section B provides background on the enforcement regime of China 
and existing bilateral treaties. In particular, it seeks to dispel the 
misperception that bilateral treaties are not important due to the lack of 
such treaties with China’s major trading partners. Section C looks into 
the content of each of the treaties. It shows the inappropriateness of 
exaggerating the similarities between the treaties, and the danger of 
confusing bilateral treaties and “reciprocity” when enforcing foreign 
 
since China does not have judicial assistance arrangements with many of its key trading partners, 
including the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.”). 
 5. See MICHAEL MOSER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA, 398 (Michael Moser ed., 2012). 
 6. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a 
US Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 767 (2004) (“the [Civil 
Procedure Law’s] standard of review provision does not specify the circumstances under which 
a Chinese court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. In practice, however, [it 
is] reflected in the bilateral treaties for judicial assistance between China and a number of foreign 
countries.”) See also JIANG WEI & BANGQING SUN, CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 381 (2008) 
(summarizing bases of enforcement rejection into four grounds while failing to distinguish the two 
branches). 
 7. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements, Nov. 25, 1965, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=98.  
 8. One commentator did compare the Hague Convention against the jurisdictional regime of 
China, See Guangjian Tu, The Hague Choice of Court Convention – A Chinese Perspective, 55 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 346, 347-49 (2007). 
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judgments. The uncertainties in the provisions of the bilateral treaties are 
also highlighted. Section D examines the enforcement cases involving the 
bilateral treaties and further shows how the current judicial practices have 
contributed to the uncertainties associated with them. Finally, based on 
the findings of the above sections, Section E discusses whether China 
should join the Hague Convention. 
II. BACKGROUND 
China’s current regime on enforcement of foreign judgments started 
in 1982 when the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(For Trial Implementation) was passed.9 Article 204 of the Civil 
Procedure Law (For Trial Implementation) provides that a foreign 
judgment can be enforced in China if either (1) there exists a treaty 
between China and the judgment rendering country (hereinafter, F110), or 
(2) the foreign judgment is enforceable on the principle of “reciprocity.”11 
This two-way regime continues despite a number of amendments to the 
Civil Procedure Law.12 The current version of the regime can be found in 
Articles 281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Law.13 
Article 281 sets out the procedures for recognition of a foreign 
judgment. In order to have a foreign judgment recognized or enforced in 
China, a party may apply directly to the intermediate people’s court with 
jurisdiction or apply to the foreign court and request recognition and 
enforcement by the people’s court in accordance with the provisions of 
an international treaty, or under the principle of reciprocity.14 
 
 9. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Implementation) 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, effective Oct. 1, 
1982). Prior to the passing of the law, there were reports of enforcement of judgments from the 
Soviet Union and Germany. See also CHENGDI YUAN, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (2003). 
 10. Similarly, “F2” will be used to refer to judgment enforcing country. Republic of China 
(for Trial Implementation), supra note 9. 
 11. Id. (“When a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China is entrusted by a foreign 
court with the execution of a final judgment or order, the people’s court shall examine it in 
accordance with any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China 
or on the principle of reciprocity. If the court deems that the judgment or order does not violate the 
fundamental principles of the law of the People’s Republic of China or her national and social 
interests, it shall order to recognize the validity of the judgment or order and execute it according 
to the procedure specified in this Law; otherwise, the people’s court shall return the judgment or 
order to the foreign court.”). 
 12. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by President of 
the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991, effective 2007) arts. 265-68 (China); Civil Procedure 
Law, supra note 2. 
 13. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2. 
 14. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 281. 
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Article 282 then sets out the substantive requirements: 
After examining an application or request for recognition and 
enforcement of an effective judgment or ruling of a foreign court in 
accordance with an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the 
People’s Republic of China or under the principle of reciprocity, a 
people’s court shall issue a ruling to recognize the legal force of the 
judgment or ruling and issue an order for enforcement as needed to 
enforce the judgment or ruling according to the relevant provisions of 
this Law if the people’s court deems that the judgment or ruling does 
not violate the basic principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of 
China and the sovereignty, security and public interest of the People’s 
Republic of China. If the judgment or ruling violates the basic 
principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of China or the 
sovereignty, security or public interest of the People’s Republic of 
China, the people’s court shall not grant recognition and 
enforcement.15 
Thus, a foreign judgment will generally be enforced16 if: 
(1) The foreign judgment is legally effective; 
(2) There is (i) a bilateral treaty or (ii) reciprocity between China 
and F1; and 
(3) The foreign judgment does not violate the basic principles of the 
laws of the People’s Republic of China and the sovereignty, security and 
public interest of China.17 
In spite of its long history, the general consensus on the Chinese 
enforcement regime, in particular of foreign countries, is one of 
suspicion. It is said that “[e]nforcement of [foreign] court judgments … 
in the People’s Republic of China has often been considered both 
challenging and unpredictable.”18 For foreign companies doing business 
with China, the conventional wisdom is to advise these companies to 
enter into an arbitration agreement with their counterparts in China 
regarding dispute resolution.19 While the legal system of China has a lot 
to do with the unsatisfactory state of the enforcement regime,20 the 
 
 15. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 282. 
 16. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 546. For ease of reference, “enforce” or 
“enforcement” will be used to cover both concepts unless otherwise specified. 
 17. Enforcing Your Judgment in China: The Truth 2, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Oct. 26, 
2016), http://www.kwm.com/en/hk/knowledge/downloads/enforcing-your-judgement-in-china-
20160915. 
 18. MOSER, supra note 5, at 381. 
 19. Id. at 2-4. 
 20. See Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the 
Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 85-7 (2002) (citing inter alia local 
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negative perception of the current regime in China must also be attributed 
to the uncertainties in the laws.21 
Of the two types of enforcement, bilateral treaties have received 
very little attention. It is usual for commentators to lay out the two types 
at the outset and then instantly brush aside bilateral treaties for their 
insignificance.22 This is the first and most common misconception of 
bilateral treaties. 
Their apparent insignificance is due to the lack of such treaties with 
the major trading partners of China, such as the USA, Japan, Korea and 
Germany.23 This network of enforcement treaties has been regarded as 
“patchy.”24 All China has at the moment are bilateral treaties with 33 
individual countries that contain arrangements on judgment 
enforcement.25 China is also not a party to any multinational convention, 
such as the Hague Convention, that specializes in the enforcement of 
foreign judgments.26 In addition, it has also been said that those countries 
which have entered into enforcement treaties with China have mainly 
been developing countries.27 This all suggests that bilateral treaties are 
insignificant to judgment enforcements. 
Although it is true that China has never entered into bilateral 
enforcement treaties with her largest trading partners, it does not 
necessarily mean that the countries with which she has entered into 
bilateral treaties are insignificant. To date, China has entered into Sino-
 
protectionism and government interference in favor of state-owned enterprises as reasons for 
difficulty in enforcing foreign judgment in China). 
 21. Yuan, supra note 6, at 763 (calling the enforcement regime of China “sketchy, skeletal, 
and replete with ambiguity”). 
 22. Duelling with Dragons: Managing Business Disputes in Today’s China, supra note 4. 
 23. MOSER, supra note 5, at 406. (“Although enforcement is in theory possible in accordance 
with several treaties to which the PRC is a party – including enforcement treaties with jurisdictions 
such as France and Italy – the network of treaties is patchy, and there are no relevant treaties 
between China and most of its major trading partners.”). 
 24. MOSER, supra note 5, at 395. 
 25. See infra Table 1. 
 26. Note that China has acceded to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1969), which provides for enforcement of foreign judgments on oil pollution 
cases in limited circumstances. However, contrary to the view of some commentators, the Bilateral 
Treaty on Encouragement and Protection of Investment between China and Australia does not 
contain enforcement arrangements on enforcement of foreign judgment. Cf. ZHENG SOPHIA TANG 
ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 149 n. 31 (Edward Elgar, 1st ed. 
2016). 
 27. King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 17, at 2. (“While [the bilateral treaties] may sound 
promising, China has to date not acceded to any international convention or multilateral treaty in 
this regard and has only entered into a limited number of bilateral enforcement treaties, most of 
which are with developing nations. China is yet to enter into applicable bilateral treaties with its 
major trading partners (including England, Germany, Australia and the USA).”). 
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foreign judicial assistance treaties with 36 countries,28 of which 33 
include enforcement of foreign judgments.29 It is noted that Singapore, 
Thailand and South Korea have entered into Sino-foreign judicial 
assistance treaties with China, but treaties with these three countries do 
not cover enforcement of foreign judgments.30 Instead, they represent 
agreement on other areas such as cooperation in obtaining evidence, 
service of process, arbitration, exchange of judicial information and 
criminal areas. These other areas are certainly relevant to judgment 
enforcement but are out of the scope of this article.31 
Table 1 sets out the 33 countries that have agreed on judgment 
enforcement, the effective date of the treaties,32 trading volumes33 and 
relevant percentage in China’s overall trading volume in 2015. 
 
Table 1 - Bilateral Treaty Countries  
Country Treaty Effective 
Date 
2015 Trade Vol  
(in 10,000 USD) 
% of Total 
Trade 
France 1988/02/08 5137005 1.300% 
Poland* 1988/02/13 1708682 0.432% 
Mongolia* 1990/10/29 536608 0.136% 
Romania* 1993/01/22 445719 0.113% 
Russia* 1993/11/14 6801554 1.721% 
Byelorussia* 1993/11/29 175972 0.045% 
 
 28. Under Chinese law, other than judgment enforcement, “judicial assistance” can include 
service of process for a foreign proceeding, taking evidence for a foreign proceeding, and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Yuan, supra note 6, at 764. 
 29. China has entered into 36 Sino-foreign judicial assistance treaties, but only 33 of them 
include arrangements on enforcement of foreign judgment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Status of 
Sino-Foreign Treaties on Civil and Criminal Judicial Assistance (2016), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/wgdwdjdsfhzty_674917/t1215630.sht
ml. The table below shows the types of judicial assistance covered by the 36 treaties. 
Areas Covered by Judicial Assistance Treaties 
 Judgment 
Enforcement 
Evidence Service 
of 
Process 
Arbitration Info 
Exchange 
Criminal  Judicial 
Record 
No. of 
Countries 
33 36 36 28 36 19 1 
 
 30. Some commentators only refer to Singapore and South Korea for not including judgment 
enforcement arrangements. This is certainly not correct. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 149. 
 31. See infra Section IV(B)(1) on how improper service of legal documents could be regarded 
as a ground of refusal for judgment enforcement under public policy. 
 32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 29. 
 33. See Total Value of Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/ Destination, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01. 
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Spain 1994/01/01 2743954 0.694% 
Ukraine* 1994/01/19 707151 0.179% 
Cuba 1994/03/26 221637 0.056% 
Italy 1995/01/01 4465424 1.130% 
Egypt* 1995/05/31 1287642 0.326% 
Bulgaria* 1995/06/30 179157 0.045% 
Kazakhstan* 1995/07/11 1429019 0.361% 
Turkey* 1995/10/26 2155148 0.545% 
Cyprus 1996/01/11 63958 0.016% 
Greece 1996/06/29 395048 0.100% 
Hungary* 1997/03/21 807300 0.204% 
Kirghizia* 1997/09/26 434069 0.110% 
Uzbekistan* 1998/08/29 349582 0.088% 
Tadzhikistan* 1998/09/02 184743 0.047% 
Morocco 1999/11/26 341870 0.086% 
Vietnam* 1999/12/25 9584877 2.425% 
Tunisia 2000/07/20 142123 0.036% 
Laos* 2001/12/15 277310 0.070% 
Lithuania* 2002/01/19 134969 0.034% 
United Arab Emirates* 2005/04/12 4853419 1.228% 
Korea DPR 2006/01/21 551061 0.139% 
Argentina 2011/10/09 1452259 0.367% 
Peru 2012/05/25 1430489 0.362% 
Algeria* 2012/06/16 835071 0.211% 
Kuwait* 2013/06/06 1126974 0.285% 
Brazil 2014/08/16 7150159 1.809% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2014/10/12 11371 0.003% 
Total  58121324 14.703% 
* Belt and Road Countries
34 
 
While countries like the USA, Japan and South Korea – the three 
largest trading partners of China – are missing from the list, there are 
bilateral treaties with Vietnam and Brazil, the 9th and 14th largest trading 
partners with China in 2015.35 More importantly, combined together, 
these 33 countries constitute 14.70% of the overall trading volume of 
China in 2015. While they are a minority, one cannot dispute that the 
 
 34. For a list of 65 Belt and Road countries and their general profile, see Country Profile, 
H.K. TRADE DEV. COUNCIL, http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/country-profiles. 
 35. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, supra note 33. 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2017  8:49 PM 
8 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:1 
aggregate trading volume with these countries is still a sizeable part of 
overall trading activities and warrants close attention. In fact, as Table 2 
shows, not even the USA, which has long been the largest trading partner 
of China, has such a proportion in the overall trading volume with China. 
 
Table 2 - Trade Volume of Bilateral Treaty Countries vs USA 
(2006-2015) 
 Countries with Bilateral Treaty USA 
Year No. Trade 
Vol (in 
10,000 
USD) 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Year-to-
Year 
Change 
Trade Vol 
(in 
10,000 
USD) 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Year-
to-Year 
Change 
2015 33 58121324 14.70% 1.72% 55702297 14.09% 1.19% 
2014 31 55834967 12.98% 0.96% 55512355 12.91% 0.38% 
2013 30 50008710 12.02% 0.56% 52074870 12.52% -0.01% 
2012 28 44341751 11.47% 0.10% 48467425 12.53% 0.27% 
2011 27 41379050 11.36% 0.23% 44658227 12.26% -0.70% 
2010 27 33103561 11.13% -0.02% 38538528 12.96% -0.55% 
2009 27 24607458 11.15% -0.83% 29826260 13.51% 0.49% 
2008 27 30701078 11.98% 0.75% 33374348 13.02% -0.86% 
2007 27 24427283 11.22% 1.24% 30206716 13.88% -1.04% 
2006 26 17571485 9.98%  26265947 14.92%  
Average    0.52%   -0.09% 
 
In 2006, there were only 26 countries that had signed a bilateral 
treaty with China, with the aggregate trading volume accounting for just 
9.98% of the total trading volume of China. This can be contrasted with 
14.92% of the USA during the same period. However, the gap has since 
closed as the number of bilateral treaties has increased. In 2014, the 
treaties countries’ trading volume exceeded that of the USA for the first 
time in history. The lead of the treaties countries continues to grow as 
their trading volume accounted for 14.70% of the total trading volume of 
China in 2015, when the USA only accounted for 14.09% in the same 
period. Over the ten years from 2006 to 2015, the average year-to-year 
change in trading volume of the treaties countries was 0.52% compared 
to -0.09% of the USA. This clearly shows that the importance of the 
treaties countries continues to climb, while that of the United States is in 
decline, or at least has plateaued.36 
 
 36. Treaties countries: t = 2.0747, df = 8, p = 0.0717; USA: t = -0.3726, df = 8, p = 0.7191 
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Another reason for the lack of attention to these bilateral treaties is 
the fact that most of these countries are developing countries.37 In fact, 
treaties with these developing countries require more attention because 
of the trading potential in the future. For example, China, Brazil and 
Russia represent three of the four members of BRIC.38 The 33 countries 
also included 8 of the 15 members of the former Soviet Union.39 More 
recently, as China is leading in the much discussed “One Belt One Road” 
project, it is important to note that 22 of the 33 treaties countries also 
happen to be Belt and Road countries.40 
 
Table 3 - Belt and Road Countries (2006-2015) 
 21 Countries (Without Iran) 22 Countries (With Iran) 
 Trade 
Volume (in 
10,000 
USD) 
% of Total 
Trade 
Change Trade 
Volume 
(in 10,000 
USD) 
% of 
Total 
Trade 
Change 
2015 34026337 8.61% -0.26% 37409093 9.46% -0.61% 
2014 38165468 8.87% 0.54% 43349702 10.08% 0.80% 
2013 34662097 8.33% 0.22% 38604748 9.28% 0.23% 
2012 31373658 8.11% 0.34% 35020242 9.06% 0.04% 
2011 28310018 7.77% 0.53% 32820358 9.01% 0.78% 
2010 21543458 7.24% 0.01% 24482565 8.23% 0.03% 
2009 15978575 7.24% -0.60% 18100483 8.20% -0.73% 
2008 20100914 7.84% 0.75% 22876677 8.92% 0.89% 
2007 15435279 7.09% 0.86% 17494244 8.04% 0.99% 
2006 10971431 6.23%  12416172 7.05%  
Average   0.26%   0.27% 
 
As Table 3 shows, there has been a continual increase in trading 
volumes of the 22 Belt and Road countries with China, reaching 8.61% 
of trading volumes of China in 2015. As the Belt and Road project 
continues to develop, it is expected that the trading volume between 
China and these 22 countries will increase at an even faster rate. 
 
 37. See KING & WOOD MALLESONS, supra note 17. 
 38. For economic growth of BRIC, see International Trade Statistics 2015, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf. 
 39. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Mar. 
10, 2017), https://global.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union. 
 40. See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, supra note 34. 
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Finally, China has reportedly entered into a new bilateral treaty with 
Iran recently.41 Once it comes into effect, it will further boost the 
proportion of the treaties countries in the overall trading volume of China 
from 14.70% to 15.56% based on the 2015 trading numbers. The share of 
the total trading volume of Belt and Road countries will also increase 
from 8.61% to 9.46%. 
In short, a sizeable part of China’s trading activities are starting to 
fall into the bilateral treaties regime. It is also likely that this regime’s 
importance is going to increase over time compared with the 
“reciprocity” arrangements. Accordingly, the real question is not whether 
the bilateral treaties are significant, but whether they are effective in 
enforcing foreign judgments. To answer that question, the next section 
looks at the substantive content of the bilateral treaties and compares 
them with each other. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTS OF THE BILATERAL TREATIES 
A common misconception about bilateral treaties is that there are 
many similarities between them.42 However, this is untrue. While they do 
share some similarities at a very general level, it is dangerous for 
litigating parties to rely on such general similarities in pursuing 
enforcement based on a particular treaty. This section shows the 
differences between the bilateral treaties in terms of the scope, refusal 
grounds for enforcement and other relevant aspects. 
Another problem in the contemporary analysis of bilateral treaties 
is the practice of confusing the discussion with reciprocity.43 As will be 
shown below, some of the treaties’ provisions are in fact contrary to the 
general provisions of the Civil Procedure Law (which applies to 
reciprocity). Although the status of international treaties in the hierarchy 
of the Chinese legal system is not clear, it is generally believed that 
treaties enjoy a higher legal standing than domestic law.44 For 
 
 41. See Sino-Iran Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Complete Strategic Partnership 
Relationship, XINHUANET (Jan. 23, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-01/23/
c_1117872814.htm. While the treaty is not publicly available, it is believed that it contains 
provisions regarding judgment enforcement, See Ministry of Justice, Delegates participating in 
Sino-Iran Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs Negotiation, http://
www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2014-12/17/content_5890548.htm?node=24391. 
 42. See MOSER, supra note 5, at 2. 
 43. See Yuan, supra note 6. 
 44. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE 
LEIGH 163 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005). (“In regard to the legal status of treaties in Chinese 
law, the Chinese Constitution does not contain any specific provisions on the matters. However, in 
practice… if a treaty to which China is a party contains provisions inconsistent with Chinese laws, 
treaty provisions should prevail, unless China has made reservations to relevant provisions.”). 
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discrepancies between bilateral treaties and the requirements in the Civil 
Procedure Law, it is specifically provided in Article 260 that the 
provisions of the treaties will prevail.45 Thus, identifying those 
discrepancies becomes significant. Differences between the treaties in 
terms of scope, refusal grounds and enforcement procedures will be 
examined below. 
A. Scope 
While all the bilateral treaties are designed to enforce foreign “civil” 
judgments, the definitions of “civil” in fact vary across different treaties. 
The substantial differences are shown in the tables below. 
 
Table 4 - Scope of the Bilateral Treaties 
 
No. of Countries 
Civil 33 
Criminal damages 33 
Commerce 27 
Labor 16 
Marriage 12 
Family 10 
Economic 5 
Fee 5 
Status 2 
Succession 1 
Exclusion 5 
 
Chinese scholars have generalized the scopes into just three types of 
judgments, namely, civil, commercial and criminal compensation.46 
Table 4 shows much more variety in the types of judgment covered by 
the bilateral treaties. Although it is clear that all the bilateral treaties cover 
civil judgments and damages which compensate the victims in criminal 
judgments, the treaties also cover various other types of judgments, 
including those related to commerce, labor, marriage, family, economic 
 
 45. Id. Where there is any discrepancy between an international treaty concluded or acceded 
to by the People’s Republic of China and this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall 
prevail, except clauses to which the People’s Republic of China has declared reservations. 
 46. TANG ET AL., supra note 26. 
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aspects, court fees, status and succession. To make it more complicated, 
five countries have also included explicit exclusions on certain sub-types 
of judgments from the aforementioned categories.47 Table 5 shows the 
different combinations of the types above. 
 
 Table 5 - Scope of the Bilateral Treaties (Combinations) 
 Combination No. of 
Countries 
Percentage 
1 Civil & Criminal damages 3 9% 
2 Civil, Criminal damages & Commercial 3 9% 
3 Civil, Criminal damages & Fee 3 9% 
4 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Status 2 6% 
5 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Labor 2 6% 
6 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Family 1 3% 
7 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & 
Exclusion 
5 15% 
8 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor & 
Family 
1 3% 
9 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor & 
Marriage 
3 9% 
10 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor, 
Family & Fee 
1 3% 
11 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor, 
Family & Marriage 
3 9% 
12 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor, 
Succession & Marriage 
1 3% 
13 Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor, 
Family, Marriage & Economic 
5 15% 
 Total 33 100% 
 
Among the 33 bilateral treaties, there are 13 different combinations 
created out of the 11 different types of judgments referred to in Table 4. 
As Table 5 shows, no combination has more than five countries. Thus, 
while prima facie, the scopes of the treaties are all “civil,” they could be 
substantially different. To make them more different, even if two treaties 
have the same scope on paper, they might not always mean the same 
things. For example, both the treaties with Turkey and Egypt have only 
 
 47. See bilateral treaties with Spain, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Peru and Tunisia. 
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included civil and criminal damages within their scope.48 However, an 
article of the treaty with Egypt49 contains references to judgments relating 
to contract, tort, immovable properties, succession, family, status and 
business, while the treaty with Turkey does not contain such references. 
It can, of course, be argued that the word “civil” in the Egypt treaty should 
be broadly interpreted to include all these additional types of judgments, 
but can the same be said of the Turkey treaty? What about those five 
treaties that expressly include civil, criminal damages, commercial, labor, 
family, marriage and economic aspects (combination 13 in Table 5)?50 
These treaties apparently define the word “civil” much more narrowly 
than the treaty with Egypt. Thus, it is dangerous to over-generalize the 
similarities between the treaties in terms of scope even if they all broadly 
cover “civil” judgments in general. If the differences in scope appear 
confusing, the refusal grounds for enforcement are even more so. 
B. Refusal grounds 
Once it is established that the foreign judgment falls within the 
scope of the relevant bilateral treaty, the foreign judgment is presumably 
enforceable subject to a number of specific refusal grounds.51 It is 
common for commentators to summarize these refusal grounds generally. 
For example, one commentator summarized the refusal grounds as 
follows: 
1) the foreign court judgment was issued by a foreign court that would 
have lacked jurisdiction under PRC law; 
2) the defendant was not served with proper notice of the foreign 
proceedings …; 
3) an effective judgment has been issued by a People’s court for the 
same cause of action between the same parties; or 
 
 48. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt, 
art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, 
Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Turk., art. 21, Sept. 28, 1992, [no official citation 
available]. 
 49. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt, 
art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available]. 
 50. See bilateral treaties with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Belarus. 
 51. Three treaties do not specify any refusal grounds per se, but express them as positive 
conditions for enforcement. In practice however, the effect should be the same. See Article 17 of 
Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Hung., art. 17, Oct. 9, 1996, [no 
official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Laos, 
art. 21, Jan. 25, 1999, [no official citation available], and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and 
Criminal Affairs, China-Cyprus, art. 25, Apr. 25, 1995, [no official citation available]. 
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4) recognition and enforcement of the foreign court judgment would 
cause harm to the national, social or public interests of the PRC.52 
Similarly, it is also common for commentators to discuss the refusal 
grounds of the bilateral treaties and reciprocity arrangements as if they 
were the same.53 However, none of these practices could stand detailed 
analysis of the treaties. 
 
Table 6 - Refusal Grounds 
  No. of Country Percentage 
Effective Judgment 33 100% 
Jurisdiction 33 100% 
Due Process 33 100% 
Res judicata 33 100% 
Public policy 33 100% 
Governing law on Status 2 6% 
Unenforceability under F2 Law 2 6% 
Inconformity of Document 1 3% 
Total 33 100% 
 
 
 52. See MOSER supra note 5, 398. See also Jie Huang, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS 74 (Hart Publishing, 1st ed. 2004). 
(“Widely recognized by scholarship and bilateral… treaties ratified by Mainland China, refusal is 
generally based on the following four grounds: (1) incompetent indirect jurisdiction; (2) unfair 
procedures; (3) res judicata; and (4) public policy exception.”). There are however different 
categorizations by other commentators. 
 53. See Zhang supra note 20, at 88-89 (“The [Civil Procedural Law] does not dictate the 
conditions under which a people’s court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. 
In practice, however, the people’s courts may strike down a petition or request for recognition and 
enforcement if the foreign judgment is found to have one of the following defects: [(1) lack of 
jurisdiction; (2) ineffective foreign judgment; (3) due process; (4) parallel proceedings or (5) public 
policy].) 
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Table 6 shows that, while the five refusal grounds are present in all 
33 treaties, five other treaties actually have additional refusal grounds. 
For example, in the bilateral treaties in France and Spain, an additional 
refusal ground is that a foreign judgment will be rejected if, in terms of a 
natural person’s status and civil capacities, F1 does not apply the choice 
of law rule of F2, unless the substantive law applied by F1 led to the same 
result as the choice of law of F2.54 For the five general refusal grounds, 
the similarities of the relevant provisions among the bilateral treaties are 
very limited, as shown in the discussion below.  
1. Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment 
Table 7 - Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment 
Type of Formulation No. of Countries % 
Not effective or 
unenforceable under F1 law 
20 61% 
Not final or unenforceable 
under F1 law 
8 24% 
Not effective under F1 law 2 6% 
Not final or unenforceable 
under F1 law; Not 
enforceable under F2 law 
2 6% 
Not certain or 
unenforceable under F1 law 
1 3% 
Total 33 100% 
 
All treaties have articles requiring that the foreign judgment has 
become legally effective under the law of F1. However, the details of 
such articles vary across different treaties. It is common for 
commentators to over-generalize these articles as requiring the judgment 
to be “not effective or unenforceable” under F1 law.55 As Table 7 shows, 
however, only 20 of the 33 treaties adopt such a formulation. The rest of 
the treaties adopt alternative formulas. For example, eight of the treaties 
provide that the foreign judgment can be rejected for enforcement if they 
 
 54. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz. art. 22(2), 
May 4, 1987, [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal 
Affairs, China-Spain, art. 22(2), May 2, 1992, [no official citation available]. Cf. HUANG, supra 
note 52 (referring only to France having such a requirement). 
 55. See YONGPING XIAO, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2007) (stating 
only such formulation as the requirement of the bilateral treaties. In particularly, reference was 
made to the treaties with Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Poland, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. However, France, Bulgaria, Morocco and Italy all in fact have different formulations.). 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2017  8:49 PM 
16 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:1 
are not final or are unenforceable under F1 law. It is unclear whether there 
is a real difference between a legally effective judgment and a final 
judgment.56 What makes it even more complicated is the fact that the 
treaties with Laos and Cyprus both add an extra requirement on 
enforceability of judgments. Under both treaties, enforceability is not 
only required under F1 law but also under F2 law.57 
Even if the 20 treaties which adopt the “effectiveness and 
enforceable” format account for the majority, one must not forget that the 
actual requirements vary substantially across different countries on what 
constitutes “legally effective,” “enforceable” and “final.” Since the 
relevant provisions in the 33 treaties all have F1 law as the governing law, 
it is foreseeable that these terms might not always mean the same thing 
in different jurisdictions. 
Finally, the general requirement of Articles 281 and 282 is that the 
judgment must be “effective.”58 No definition is provided for the term 
“effective” in the Civil Procedure Law, nor is there any reference to 
“final” or “unenforceable.”59 There is also no specification in the 
governing law of the effectiveness requirement. As argued above, where 
there is a discrepancy between bilateral treaties and the Civil Procedure 
Law, the provision in bilateral treaties will prevail.60 It is therefore 
submitted that parties should only consider the relevant provision of the 
bilateral treaty under F1 law if there exists a bilateral treaty between F1 
and China. On the other hand, in cases where there is no bilateral treaty, 
parties should be cautious in drawing an analogy with the relevant 
provisions of the bilateral treaty in the interpretation of effectiveness in 
reciprocity cases.61 
 
 
 
 
 56. Whether there is a difference shall ultimately depend on the law of F1. However, see 
discussion on Schneider Electric SA v. Xu Xiao-Xu, Chongqing No. 1 IPC, (2011), Yu Yi Zhong 
Fa Min Chu Zi No. 385, infra note 159 below. 
 57. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Laos, art. 21, Jan. 25, 
1999, [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, 
China-Cyprus, art. 25, Apr. 25, 1995, [no official citation available]. 
 58. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE 
LEIGH, supra note 44. 
 61. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note 
54 art. 22(2) [no official citation available]; the treaty with France, the first ever bilateral treaty 
signed by the PRC adopts the rare “not certain or unenforceable” format, and does not use the term 
“effective” in the treaty. For practice of discussing the respective requirement under the bilateral 
treaties and Civil Procedure Law as if they are the same, see Xiao, supra note 55, at 25. 
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2. Jurisdictional Requirement 
Table 8 – Jurisdictional Requirement 
 Type 1 – 
Exclusive 
Jurisdiction 
Only 
Type 2 – 
Respective 
Jurisdiction 
Type 3 – 
Objective 
Jurisdiction 
Total 
List of 
Countries 
   - 
No. of 
Countries 
8 14 11 33 
Percentage 24% 42% 33% 100% 
 
All 33 treaties require the judgment rendering court to have satisfied 
some jurisdiction requirements, but such requirements vary across the 
bilateral treaties. There are generally three types of jurisdictional 
requirements.62 The first type simply requires the foreign judgment not to 
be in an area that is designated as the exclusive jurisdiction of F2. Thus, 
when China is the judgment enforcing country, reference will need to be 
made to the jurisdictional rules of China and particularly the rules 
regarding exclusive jurisdiction. For example, if the foreign judgment is 
on immovable properties located in China, it will be a ground to reject 
the enforcement in China since immovable property is designated as 
being subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chinese courts.63 
The second type of jurisdiction requirement is much broader than 
the first type and requires the F1 court to have complied with the 
jurisdiction requirements of F2 as if the latter is taking the case in the first 
place. This will have the effect of equating the direct jurisdictional rules 
 
 62. These three types of indirect jurisdictional bases are recognized by a number of 
commentators, despite not giving them the same labels herein. See, e.g., TANG ET AL., supra note 
26. 
 63. See Moses, supra note 5, at 110. (“The Civil Procedure Law contains provisions 
concerning exclusive jurisdiction, one of the most important principles of which states that a dispute 
over real estate shall be under the jurisdiction of the court where the property is located [under CPL, 
Art 34]. In relation to foreign-related disputes, Article [266] provides that disputes related to joint 
venture contracts or joint exploration and development of natural resources shall be under the 
jurisdiction of the people’s courts. Such disputes may be arbitrated, but may not be heard by a court 
outside of China.”). 
This is actually one of the advantages of arbitration over litigation for disputes involving China. 
See supra note 5, at 4 (“it should be noted that PRC law prohibits parties from submitting certain 
disputes to foreign courts, but does allow the parties to select arbitration [under CPL, arts. 34 and 
246]. The types of disputes covered include those involving real estate and natural resources 
projects and those arising out of Sino-foreign joint ventures.”). 
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with the indirect jurisdictional rules in enforcement.64 Thus, if France 
rendered a judgment on the sole basis that the plaintiff is a French 
national,65 and no other jurisdictional basis is found, enforcement of this 
French judgment could be rejected in China since the Chinese nationality 
of the plaintiff is not a basis for Chinese courts to take jurisdiction if the 
case were to be tried in China.66 
Finally, instead of having regard to the direct jurisdictional rules of 
F2, some bilateral treaties set out a laundry list of acceptable 
jurisdictional bases. However, these jurisdictional bases are still subject 
to the exclusive jurisdictional bases of F2. Thus, even if having a business 
representative in F1 is an acceptable jurisdictional basis under the Sino-
Spanish bilateral treaty in business disputes,67 the Spanish judgment 
would not be enforceable in China if, for example, the business dispute 
is on the equity interests in a Sino-foreign joint venture which is one of 
the areas designated as being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Chinese courts.68 Some commentators have argued that there were no 
such reservations of exclusive jurisdiction in the Type 3 bilateral treaties, 
but this is simply incorrect as a matter of fact.69 
The distributions of the three types of jurisdiction requirement are 
relatively even as shown in Table 8 above. Although Type 2 constitutes 
the majority, it consists of no more than 42% of the 33 treaties.70 Type 1 
which has the fewest treaties adopted still constitutes 24%. 
Looking at the three types of jurisdiction bases, it is clear that the 
common thread is the exclusive jurisdiction reserved for Chinese law, but 
there is substantial difference beyond that, with Type 1 being the easiest 
to enforce and Type 2 being the most difficult. 
 
 64. The term indirect jurisdiction is often used in Chinese legal literature, see, e.g., ZHONGBO 
ZHANG, STUDY ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (GUOJI SIFA XUE) 497 (2012). For a general 
discussion of direct and indirect jurisdictions, see Huang, supra note 52 at 220-23. 
 65. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 14 (Fr.). 
 66. See Arts. 265-66, Civil Procedure Law. 
 67. See Arts. 21(1)(2) and 22(1) and of Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal 
Affairs on 2 May 1992 between the PRC and Spain. 
 68. See Arts. 21(2)(1) and 22(1) of Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs 
on 2 May 1992 between the PRC and Spain, and art. 266 of the Civil Procedure Law. 
 69. TANG ET AL., supra note 26. (“Exclusive jurisdiction in Chinese domestic law has a broad 
scope, which makes it easy to conflict with the treaty jurisdiction rules. Taking the China-Spain 
Treaty as an example, it does not expressly reserve exclusive jurisdiction rules of either country 
and the treaty jurisdiction rules are only consistent with the Chinese exclusive jurisdiction in terms 
of succession and immoveable property.”). The authors have simply omitted art. 22(1)(2) which 
provides that the objective jurisdictional bases are subject to the regulations on exclusive 
jurisdiction of both countries. 
 70. MOSER, supra note 5, at 45-92. 
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Chinese commentators generally criticize Type 2 but prefer Type 3. 
According to them, Type 2 is problematic because “the diversity of 
domestic jurisdiction rules would render many judgments given by a 
court duly taking jurisdiction under its domestic law unenforceable in the 
other contracting state.”71 While this criticism against Type 2 may be 
justified, the preference for Type 3 is not. Commentators praised the 
objectivity of Type 3 rule as one that promotes certainty,72 but this is far 
from the truth. In fact, the jurisdiction requirements for the enforcement 
of foreign judgments in China are relatively certain for Types 1 and 2 – 
one only needs to check the relevant exclusive jurisdictional bases of 
China for Type 1 and the general jurisdictional bases of China for Type 
2 respectively. However, the requirements for Type 3 vary substantially. 
In total, there are 16 different jurisdictional bases that have been 
adopted by 33 bilateral treaties. These range from bases that all treaties 
have adopted, such as F2 being the location of the immovable property 
or the place of residence of the defendant, to bases that only a few 
jurisdictions have adopted, such as the place of the debtor for custody 
cases.73 More importantly, it is unclear which law is to be applied to 
determine whether the jurisdictional bases are satisfied. Most of the 
treaties are silent as to the governing law. This will be particularly 
problematic if the laws of F1 and F2 are different in a given jurisdictional 
basis. 
 
 71. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 154. 
 72. See WEIZUO CHEN, COMPARATIVE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (2008). 
 73. Detailed Breakdown of Objective Jurisdiction Bases 
Jurisdictional Basis No. of Country 
Location of Immovable Property 11 
Defendant Place of Residence 11 
Business – Place of Agent 10 
Contract – Place of Performance 11 
Contract – Location of Subject Matter 9 
Contract – Place of Execution 9 
Tort – Place of Act 11 
Tort – Place of Consequence 9 
Preliminary Action 2 
Exclusive Jurisdiction of F2 11 
Succession – Place of Death of Deceased or Place where Major Assets are 
Located 
7 
Explicit Jurisdiction Agreement 11 
Defendant Defensed on Merit and Did not Argue on Jurisdiction 8 
Status – Place of the Subject Person 5 
Custody – Place of Debtor 6 
Defendant’s representative in F2 1 
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For example, while the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty provides that the 
F1 court will have jurisdiction over a contractual dispute if F1 is the place 
of performance of the contract,74 the definition of place of performance is 
different under PRC law and Italian law when it is not specified clearly 
in the contract. Under PRC law, when the place of performance is not 
specified in the contract, it is presumed as the place where the recipient 
of money is located if the subject matter of dispute is the payment of 
money.75 However, under Italian law, in the case of the sale of goods, the 
place of performance is presumed to be the place where the goods were 
delivered, or should have been delivered.76 Thus, in a sale of goods 
contract between a Chinese seller and an Italian buyer, if there is no 
jurisdiction clause nor a specific provision designating the place of 
performance, the place of performance will be presumed to be China 
under Chinese law, assuming that is where payment will be received, 
while it will be presumed to be Italy assuming delivery will be made in 
Italy. Note that the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates provide that F1’s determination of objective jurisdictional bases 
shall be binding on F2 unless it is a default judgment.77 However, there is 
no equivalent in the rest of the Type 3 bilateral treaties and one simply 
cannot assume such a requirement is implied because of the existence of 
such articles in the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates. The Type 3 treaties would be much improved if clauses, like 
those in the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, 
or further guidance within the treaty were included. 
Finally, it must be noted that Chinese scholars have generally argued 
that a jurisdictional requirement is necessary in all enforcement cases, 
including cases not under the bilateral treaties regime (meaning therefore 
under the reciprocity regime), even though this is not stated in Articles 
281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Law.78 On many occasions, the 
justification is simply that jurisdiction is a common requirement in the 
bilateral treaties.79 One commentator further argued that jurisdiction 
 
 74. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., art. 22(2), May 20, 
1991, [no official citation available]. 
 75. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 16, art. 18. 
 76. See Reform of the Italian System of Private International Law, Law No. 218, art. 32, May 
31, 1995. 
 77. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., art. 20, Apr. 
21, 2004 [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial 
Affairs, China-Kuwait, art. 20, June 18, 2007, ST. COUNCIL GAZ. [no official citation available]. 
 78. See QU GUANG QING, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 153 (Beijing Law Press, 
2004); see also WENLIANG ZHANG, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
IN CHINA: RULES, PRACTICES, AND STRATEGIES (Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
 79. Id. 
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should be included under reciprocity since there is “no justification for 
Chinese national law to grant an even more favorable treatment by 
relinquishing the jurisdictional requirement, to judgments from the 
countries having no such bilateral agreements with China.”80 The validity 
of this argument, however, depends on how stringent the reciprocity 
requirement is, but it is certainly not supported by judicial practice. There 
is no reported case under the reciprocity regime that failed on lack of 
jurisdiction. Moreover, even without jurisdiction as a refusal ground, 
reciprocity appears to be much more difficult to satisfy than bilateral 
treaties. While the success rate under bilateral treaties is not high,81 there 
is only one successful case under reciprocity.82 
Even if it makes sense to include jurisdiction in the reciprocity 
regime, it is submitted that its omission should only been seen as 
regrettable, and one cannot imply such a requirement without solid legal 
sources. 
3. Improper Procedure in the F1 Proceeding83 
Table 9 - Improper Procedure in the F1 Proceedings 
Summon 
legal rep 
under F1 
law 
Summon 
under F1 
law 
Legal 
rep 
under 
F1 
law 
Summon, 
defend 
legal rep 
under F1 
law 
Summon 
under F1 
law; 
legal rep 
under F2 
law 
 
Summon 
under F1 
law; 
legal rep 
(law not 
specified) 
 
Summon 
under F1 
law; 
defend/ 
rep (law 
not 
specified) 
 
Total 
23 3 1 2 2 1 1 33 
70% 9% 3% 6% 6% 3% 3% 100% 
 
In all 33 bilateral treaties, there are also refusal grounds that can be 
broadly categorized as ways to examine whether the proceedings in F1 
are proper. Commentators again like to over-generalize the requirement.84 
However, the detailed requirements indeed vary between bilateral 
treaties. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See infra Section IV. 
 82. See Kolmar Group AG v. Jiangsu Textile Industry (Group) Import & Export 
Co., Ltd. (2016) Su01 Assisting Foreign Recognition No 3. 
 83. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 150-151 
 84. MOSER, supra note 5. 
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As Table 9 above shows, 23 of the 33 bilateral treaties provide that 
(1) the defendant must be summoned if absent from the proceedings, and 
(2) where the defendant is not capable, then he must receive proper legal 
representation.85 Both these requirements are governed by the law of the 
judgment rendering country. However, in the remaining 10 bilateral 
treaties, the requirements are not the same. Some treaties only provide for 
one of the two aforementioned F1 procedural requirements (three only 
provide for proper summoning, and one only provides proper legal 
representation). Two treaties provide for an additional F1 procedural 
requirement, namely, the defendant has been provided with the 
opportunity to properly defend himself or herself in the F1 proceedings. 
Some treaties vary in the law governing the F1 procedural requirement. 
For example, two treaties state that the summoning requirement will be 
governed by the law of F1, while the requirement on legal representation 
will be governed by the law of F2. Some treaties do not specify the law 
governing some of the requirements. Finally, even among the 23 treaties 
that provide for proper summoning and legal representation, since they 
are all subject to F1 law, such as the requirement on effectiveness, the 
actual applications of this requirement could be very different depending 
on the F1 law involved.86  
There is no equivalent requirement under the reciprocity regime.87 
One could, however, argue that the requirement is partly contained in 
Article 543 of the 2015 Interpretation which provides that “[i]f the 
judgment or ruling rendered by the foreign court is a default judgment or 
ruling, the applicant shall, at the same time, submit the certification 
documents on a legal summons from the foreign court.”88 That being said, 
Article 543 does not state that non-compliance will result in refusal of 
enforcement. Accordingly, like jurisdiction, it would not be proper to 
include improper procedure as a refusal ground for the reciprocity 
regime. 
  
 
 85. Id. (Note that the latter requirement was sometimes omitted by commentators). 
 86. For a brief summary of the equivalent rules under Chinese law, see supra note 5, 117-118, 
see MOSER, supra note 5, at 117-118 ( “After the receipt of the complaint, the defendant is granted 
a certain period to respond to the complaint by a written acknowledgement. During this period, the 
defendant may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute by filing an objection, on grounds 
of [subject matter jurisdiction], by territory, by agreement, exclusive jurisdiction and forum non 
conveniens… The court is required to review the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding with trial 
procedures, and to make a decision and issue an order accordingly. The defendant is entitled to a 
reconsideration if the defendant is not satisfied with the order.”). 
 87. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Implementation), supra 
note 9, art. 281-282. 
 88. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 16, art. 543. 
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4. Parallel Proceedings89 
Table 10 - Parallel Proceedings 
F2 made judgment + in process 
+enforced 3rd country judgment 
21 64% 
F2 made judgment + enforced 3rd 
country judgment 
5 15% 
F2 made judgment + in process (before 
F1) +enforced 3rd country judgment 
3 9% 
F2 made judgment + in process (before 
F1) 
2 6% 
F2 in process (before F1) or enforced 3rd 
country judgment 
1 3% 
F2 initiated proceeding 1 3% 
Total 33 100% 
 
In all 33 bilateral treaties, F2 may refuse enforcement of the foreign 
judgment if it has engaged in some form of parallel proceedings. Some 
commentators simply refer to a requirement to ensure “an effective 
judgment has been issued by a People’s court for the same cause of action 
between the same parties.”90 However, the differences between the 
bilateral treaties are significant as reflected in Table 10. 
The most common provision is that F2 (1) has already made a 
judgment, (2) has a proceeding in process, or (3) has enforced a judgment 
from a third country that involved the same parties and subject matter.91 
This provision accounts for 21 of the 33 bilateral treaties. However, 12 
other treaties have different requirements. For example, five treaties only 
cover the first and third types of parallel proceedings above, while three 
other treaties specify that for parallel proceedings in process in F2 (the 
second situation above), the proceedings must be initiated prior to the one 
which rendered the judgment in F1. Together, there are six different sets 
of requirements. 
 
 89. HUANG, supra note 52. 
 90. MOSER, supra note 5, at 398. 
 91. One commentator claimed that only Poland and France treaties have such requirements, 
see DEPEI HAN, RESEARCH ON CHINESE CONFLICT OF LAWS 399 (1993); However, even at the 
time it was written, at least one more bilateral treaty contains such requirements, see Judicial 
Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Mong., art. 18(3), Aug. 31, 1989 [no official 
citation available]. 
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 92. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 75, art. 522. 
 93. See Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application 
of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by Judicial Interpretation No.22 [1922] of the Supreme People’s Court, Jul. 14, 
1992) art. 306, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=2408&l=en.. (“For the 
cases over which both the people’s court of the People’s Republic of China and the foreign court 
have jurisdiction, if one party files a lawsuit with the foreign court but the other party files a lawsuit 
with the people’s court of the People’s Republic of China, the people’s court may accept the case. 
If, after a judgment was rendered, the foreign court or one party requests the people’s court’s to 
recognize and enforce the judgment or ruling rendered by the foreign court concerning this case, 
the people’s court shall not consent to the request, unless it is otherwise prescribed by an 
international treaty concluded or acceded to by both countries.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. In fact, the same requirement could be found as early as 1992 when the SPC promulgated 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China. Id. 
 96. See QING supra note 78, at 92. 
 97. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE 
LEIGH, supra note 44. 
Article 522 of the 2015 Interpretation provides for a similar 
requirement.
92
 Under the said article, a foreign judgment will be rejected 
if the Chinese court has already rendered a judgment on the same action 
between the parties at the time of the enforcement request.
93
 This 
requirement is expressly subject to international treaties.
94
 Since all 
bilateral treaties have covered this ground, it is submitted that there will 
not be direct conflict in practice, but the bilateral treaties are apparently 
broader in scope. 
This Article is significant for two additional reasons. First, parallel 
proceedings have never been an express refusal ground under Articles 
281 and 282, nor their predecessors. The SPC was of the opinion that this 
is an essential addition thereto.
95
 However, the SPC has never done the 
same for the jurisdiction requirement which is also not an express ground 
covered by Articles 281 and 282, thus adding to the argument against 
such a requirement being implied in the reciprocity regime.
96
 Second, the 
fact that the provision is expressly subject to treaties is further 
confirmation by the SPC that the treaties are to prevail in case of conflict 
between the treaties and Civil Procedure Law.97 
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The bilateral treaties all provide that the foreign judgment will not 
be enforced if it is contrary to the public policy of F2. However, despite 
a view to the contrary, the formulations of what constitutes “public 
policy” vary.98 
The definitions of all but one treaty include sovereignty and national 
security of F2.99 However, all of them include additional elements beyond 
sovereignty and national security. Together, there are thirteen different 
 
 98. For common formulation, see e.g. MOSER supra note 5, at 398 (“recognition and 
enforcement of the foreign court judgment would cause harm to the national, social or public 
interests of the PRC.”). 
 99. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Hung., art. 17, Oct. 
9, 1995, [no official citation available]. 
5. Public Policy 
Table 11 - Public Policy 
Public Policy Requirement No. of 
Treaties 
% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order 13 39% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Non-judicial 3 9% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Significant public interest/ 
Basic legal principles/ Non-judicial   
3 9% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic legal 
principles 
2 6% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Constitutional 
principles/ Current law 
2 6% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Significant public interest/ 
Basic legal principles 
2 6% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic interests 2 6% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Social public 
order/ Non-judicial 
1 3% 
F2 Basic principles 1 3% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order / Basic Interest/ 
Basic legal principles/ 
1 3% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic interest/ 
Basic legal principles 
1 3% 
Sovereignty/ Security (decided by F2)/ Basic legal 
principles 
1 3% 
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Significant 
interests 
1 3% 
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formulations of the public policy requirement. The most common 
formulation is sovereignty, security and public order, but it still only 
accounts for thirteen of the thirty-three treaties. More importantly, since 
no definition for these different terms has ever been provided in any of 
the relevant treaties, it is not clear what each of them mean. For example, 
are “significant public interests” the same as “significant interests”?100 Or 
is there any real difference between “significant interests” and “basic 
interests”?101 This uncertainty echoes the observation of Chinese scholars 
on ordre public in general who called the doctrine “neither precise nor 
uniform.”102 
Further, Article 282 provides generally that enforcement of a 
judgment should be subject to the foreign judgment not being inconsistent 
with China’s sovereignty, security, public order and basic legal 
principles.103 These terms are not defined there either.104 In Table 11, only 
two treaties adopt the same formulation.105 If the public policy 
requirements in the treaties are in conflict with Article 282, the treaties’ 
requirement shall prevail.106 
  
 
 100. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Arg., art. 7, Aug. 31, 
1989, [no official citation available]. (providing for “significant public interests”), and Judicial 
Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Lith., art. 9, Mar. 20, 2000, [no official 
citation available] (providing for “significant interests”). 
 101. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Lith., supra note 100, 
art. 9, [no official citation available] (providing for “significant interests”), and Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt, art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official 
citation available] (providing for “basic interests”). 
 102. See Yongping Xiao & Zhengxin Huo, Ordre Public in China’s Private International Law, 
53 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 659 (2005). 
 103. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, at Art. 282. This provision can in fact be traced 
back to Article 204 of the Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation)(1982), the earliest law that 
adopted the doctrine of ordre public in a formal manner. See also id. at 656. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cuba, art. 13, Mar. 
20, 2000, [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, 
China-Ukr., art. 11, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available]. 
 106. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE 
LEIGH, supra note 44, at 163. 
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6. Document Inconformity 
Finally, it must be noted that all treaties provide for the documents 
to be submitted in the enforcement proceedings in F2.107 However, as 
Table 6 has shown, only one treaty expressly provides that inconformity 
to the document requirement could lead to lack of enforcement.108 As will 
be seen in Section D, the lack of a relevant refusal ground may have led 
to the Chinese courts applying public policy as a ground of rejection in 
case of documentary inconformity.109 
C. Other Aspects 
1. Partial Enforcement 
Table 12 – Partial Enforcement 
 Partial Enforcement 
Provided 
Partial Enforcement Not 
Provided 
No. of Treaties 10 23 
Percentage 30% 70% 
 
Generally, if a foreign judgment falls within the scope of the treaty 
and is not rejected on any of the refusal grounds set out above, the 
judgment will prima facie be enforceable in China. But what if only part 
of the foreign judgment fails on one or more of the aforementioned 
refusal grounds? What will be the consequence in that case? Presumably, 
that would mean the foreign judgment is not enforceable at all. However, 
in 10 of the 33 treaties, it is expressly provided that the foreign judgment 
can be partially enforced.110 This is achieved by not enforcing the part that 
is contrary to the enforcement conditions.111 
 
 
 
 107. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-
Lith., supra note 100, art. 17(2), [no official citation available] (requiring the 
submission to F2 documents, such as copy of the foreign judgment, document 
proving proper summons of the defendant in case of default judgment, and proof of 
proper legal representation of legally incapable defendant). 
 108. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Arg.,supra note 100, 
art. 18(5), Aug. 31, 1989, [no official citation available]. 
 109. See infra Section D. 
 110. See bilateral treaties with Greece, Kuwait, Bulgaria, Argentina, Brazil, United Arab 
Emirates, Algeria, Peru, Tunisia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 111. Id. 
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2. Party Initiating Enforcement Proceedings 
Table 13 – Party Initiating Enforcement Proceedings 
 Party can directly file with no conditions Party cannot directly file 
Who can 
initiate 
Party 
Directly 
Party 
Directly, or 
Party 
through F1 
Court 
Party 
Directly, or 
F1 Court 
Directly 
Party through 
F1 Court, or 
Party Directly if 
Resident in F2 
Court 
Directly 
No. of 
Treaties 
8 8 10 6 1 
33 26 7 
 
Who can initiate the enforcement proceedings? Under the bilateral 
treaties, there are five different formulas which consist of combinations 
of initiations of the proceedings by the litigating party, and/or by the 
court. At one end, eight treaties allow only the party to file directly for 
enforcement in China. At the other, one treaty allows only the F1 court 
to file for enforcement.112 However, in most cases it is a combination of 
both. In eight treaties, the party can file either directly in the F2 court or 
through the F1 court. In ten other treaties, both the F1 court and the party 
can file directly in the F2 court. In total, there are 26 treaties that make it 
possible for the party to file directly without any conditions. On the other 
hand, apart from one treaty which only allows the F1 court to file an 
enforcement directly, there are six other treaties that allow the party to 
file an enforcement directly to F2 but only if the filing party is resident in 
China. 
This is to be contrasted with the requirement under Article 281. 
Generally, China allows both the parties and the F1 court to file the 
foreign judgment enforcement directly in Chinese courts.113 Again, when 
the requirement of Article 281 is in conflict with the relevant requirement 
in the treaties, the treaties’ requirement shall prevail.114 
3. Definition of Judgment 
Finally, there could be further complications regarding the 
definition of “judgment.” Although the majority of treaties define 
 
 112. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Turk., 
art. 21(1), Sept. 28, 1992, [no official citation available]. 
 113. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 281. 
 114. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE 
LEIGH, supra note 44, at 163 
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“judgment” to include a “mediation agreement,”115 treaties with France 
and Algeria do not have the same provision.116 In addition, for the treaties 
with Italy, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, it is provided that the 
enforcement mediation agreement is only subject to compliance with the 
public policy of F2 without reference to any of the other refusal grounds 
above.117 
Having regard to the various differences between the bilateral 
treaties, one can easily see the substantial variety, from the scope of the 
treaties and enforcement conditions, to other enforcement aspects. With 
all these differences, it is safe to say that no treaties are identical. This is 
hardly surprising considering that each of the treaties were entered into 
with a different country, at different times and under different negotiation 
backgrounds. While China might have initiated the negotiation of a given 
bilateral treaty using certain standard forms of treaty provisions, it is 
natural that the final products have deviated as a result of the actual 
negotiations. Even if the same terminology is used, it is expected that 
different countries might have a different understanding of it. Without a 
neutral umpire like the European Court of Justice in the Brussels 
Regulations, all the treaties provide that any disputes over the meaning 
of the treaties will be resolved ultimately by diplomatic negotiations.118 
The interpretation of certain terms in one treaty cannot therefore be relied 
on in another treaty. It is even more dangerous to use the provision and/or 
interpretation thereof to interpret the requirements under the reciprocity 
regime. Apart from avoiding these pitfalls, it is submitted that there exists 
plenty of uncertainties from the examination of treaties. The following 
 
 115. For a brief summary of mediation in Chinese court, see Moser, supra note 5, at 125, 369. 
See also MOSER, supra note 5, at 367. (“Mediation, also referred to as “conciliation,” is an informal 
dispute resolution process whereby a mediator or neutral third party is used to facilitate negotiation 
and resolution between parties. There are many forms of mediation, ranging from collaborative to 
adversarial, informal to formal. Additionally, mediation can occur at anytime during the dispute, 
from inception to post-award.”). See also MOSER, supra note 5, at 375. (“In civil suits, the courts 
are authorized to resolve disputes by mediation with the consent of the parties. This can occur at 
the courts initiative at anytime including after the close of trial prior to the issuance of a judgment. 
Mediation is generally not a separate process and judge has a lot of discretionary power to direct 
the parties.”). 
 116. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note 
54 [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, 
China-Alg., Jan. 10, 2010, [no official citation available]. 
 117. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra note 
77, art. 25, [no official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial 
Affairs, China-Kuwait, supra  note 77, art. 25, and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal 
Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, art. 27[no official citation available]. 
 118. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra 
note 77, art. 28 [no official citation available]. 
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section seeks to explore whether such uncertainties could be clarified by 
Chinese courts in actual cases. 
IV. JUDICIAL PRACTICES RELATING TO BILATERAL TREATIES 
The cases were identified mainly through search phrases in four 
databases, China Judgement Online, LawinfoChina, Westlaw and 
LexisNexis. The first database is the official database of the Supreme 
People’s Court.119 LawinfoChina has been widely regarded as the best 
commercial database on Chinese cases,120 while the latter two are market 
leaders in case databases worldwide. This is further supplemented by 
cases discussed in books, articles and other trustworthy sources that 
contain enforcement cases. For a case to be an enforcement case, 
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment must have been sought 
in a Chinese court therein. The survey identified in total 2,846 
enforcement cases in China as of December 31, 2016, the last full 
calendar year at the time this article was written. 
 
Table 14 - Enforcement Cases in China 
 Treaties Cases Reciprocity Cases Total 
No. of cases 29 2,817 2,846 
Percentage 1% 99% 100% 
 
It has always been the belief of commentators that enforcements of 
foreign judgments in China pursuant to bilateral treaties are rare.121 Of the 
2,846 enforcement cases, only 29 fall into treaty cases, which are defined 
in this article as cases involving enforcement of judicial decisions 
rendered by the court of a foreign state that has entered into a bilateral 
treaty with China on enforcement of judgments (hereinafter “treaty 
cases.”) These treaty cases account for less than one percent of all 
enforcement cases, and the remaining cases are all cases under the 
reciprocity regime (hereinafter “reciprocity cases”). Government data 
released by the Ministry of Justice also supported the small number of 
treaty cases. For example, in the five years between 2010 and 2014, there 
 
 119. China Judgments Online, Index, WENSHU COURT, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/Index. 
 120. See Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It 
Heading?, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743, 747 (2012) (calling the database “authoritative and widely-
used”). 
 121. See MOSER, supra note 5, at 398 (“In practice, there is a very limited record of 
enforcement of foreign court judgments in the PRC pursuant to the Sino-foreign judicial assistance 
treaties. In one case, involving a judgment issued by an Italian court, recognition was successful). 
See also Jingxia Shi, Recent Developments in Chinese Cross-Border Insolvencies, 2002 AUSTL. J. 
CORP. L. 18, 6 (2002). 
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were reportedly more than 3,100 cases regarding judicial assistance 
annually, of which only five cases were on judgment enforcement 
(0.16%).122 In the first six months of 2015, there were 1,040 cases 
regarding judicial assistance generally, but only seven cases were on 
judgment enforcement (0.67%).123 In the first nine months of 2016, there 
were 1,928 cases regarding judicial assistance generally, but only 
fourteen cases were on judgment enforcement (0.73%).124  In addition, 
the government statistics do not make it clear that these enforcement 
cases are necessarily treaty cases, making them potentially rarer in 
practice. 
Similar searches have been performed with the case databases in 
France125 and Russia;126 both are key trading partners of China (ranking 
as the 20th and 16th largest trading partners of China as of 2015, 
respectively)127and both have been in bilateral treaties with China for a 
long time (1987 for the French treaty and 1992 for the Russian treaty). 
There was only one divorce case that can be identified in the French 
database128 and there is no relevant case in the Russian database. These 
limited data seem to suggest that the bilateral treaties are not only 
inefficient in enforcing foreign judgments in China, but also inefficient 
in enforcing Chinese judgments in the foreign signatories. 
All of the above suggests that the bilateral treaties are not effective 
in enforcing foreign judgments in China. The real issue that requires our 
attention is the reason behind such ineffectiveness. 
A. Not All Treaty Cases Applied the Treaties 
While it is expected that the treaty cases will be decided based on 
the application of the relevant treaty, only eighteen cases (62%) cited the 
treaties in the judgment. For the remaining eleven cases (38%), the 
relevant treaties were never referred to, even though the cases were 
 
 122. See Overview of Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs, 
MINISTRY OF JUST. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2014-
12/17/content_5890548.htm?node=24391. 
 123. See Statistic on Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs cases in the first half 
of 2015, MINISTRY OF JUST. (Jul. 27, 2015), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2015-
07/27/content_6190902.htm?node=24391. 
 124. See Judicial Statistics on Civil and Commercial Matters, MINISTRY OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 
2016), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2016-09/26/content_6817093.htm?node=24391. 
 125. Search has been performed using phrases “4 mai 1987” + “entraide” in legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 126. Search has been performed in http://www.consultant.ru. 
 127. Russia and France were the 3rd and 4th largest trading partners of China in 2015 among the 
33 countries, just behind Vietnam and Brazil. See infra Table 1. 
 128. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 25, 2016, 15-
14754 (Fr.). 
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rendered by the court of a country which had such a bilateral treaty with 
China. The low percentage of treaty cases utilizing the bilateral treaties 
suggests that not all Chinese judges are even aware of the existence of 
the bilateral treaties. 
B. Success Rate is Not High 
Table 15 - Success Rate 
 Enforced Recognized Partially 
Enforced/ 
Recognized 
Denied Total 
No. of 
Cases 
2 12 7 8 29 
Percentage 7% 41% 24% 28% 100 
 
Only about half of the treaties cases were either fully enforced or 
recognized. Eight cases were completely rejected and six were partially 
rejected. The low success rate will no doubt negatively affect the 
motivation of the litigating parties to utilize the bilateral treaties to seek 
enforcement in China. Table 16 below summarizes the bases of 
rejections. 
 
Table 16 - Rejection Grounds 
Bases of Rejections No. of Cases Percentage 
Public policy 3 7% 
Ineffective judgment 1 7% 
Document inconformity 1 20% 
Involvement of 3rd party interest 1 7% 
Improper venue 1 7% 
Not presented for enforcement 1 7% 
No explanation 7 47% 
Total 15 7% 
 
The first observation on the grounds of denial is the small number 
of cases that were denied under the official rejection grounds of the 
bilateral treaties. No case actually failed for lack of jurisdiction, F1 
improper procedure, or parallel proceedings. Only one case failed on 
ineffective judgment and three cases failed on public policy. In other 
words, Chinese courts have been finding additional grounds to reject 
enforcement beyond the specified refusal grounds. Among these cases, 
seven of them (almost half of the failed cases) are without explanation in 
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the judgments. The different grounds of rejection will be examined in 
turn below. 
1. Public Policy 
As the designated “very unruly horse,”129 Chinese academics echoed 
the pledge of their counterparts in the west to limit the application of 
public policy.130 It should be “interpreted restrictively and invoked 
prudently.”131 With three of the 15 rejections coming from public policy, 
it certainly demands deeper examination, particularly when two such 
cases were actually decided by the Supreme People’s Court. 
In Minsk Automatic Production Corporation United v. CNMTC,132 
the judgment creditor sought to enforce a judgment from the Supreme 
Economic Court of the Republic of Belarus in the No. 2 Intermediate 
Court of Beijing.133 It was argued that the judgment could not be enforced 
because it had been served on the defendant in China directly by post by 
the Belarus court instead of through the relevant Chinese authority. Since 
service by post is neither allowed under the Hague Service Convention134 
nor the Sino-Belarusian bilateral treaty,135 the enforcement was rejected. 
This was confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court.136 
The most controversial part of the judgment was the basis of 
rejection. The Beijing court suggested that it should be rejected under 
Article 21(5) of the Sino-Belarusian bilateral treaty.137 This basis of 
rejection was expressly approved by the Supreme People’s Court in its 
reply to the Beijing court.138 As Article 21(5) provides for rejection due 
to contravention of F2’s sovereignty, security and public order, the case 
is thus categorized as failing on public policy in Table 16 above, even 
 
 129. See Xiao & Huo, supra note 102, 654. 
 130. See SHUANGYUAN LI, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 612 
(1996) (arguing that China should avoid utilizing public policy to reject judicial assistance to 
foreign countries as much as possible in practice for fear of adversely affecting comity). 
 131. See Xiao & Huo, supra note 102, 676. 
 132. Minsk Automatic Production Corp. United v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG MIN RENZI NO. 01815 
(No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001); Supreme Econ. Ct. of the Rep. of Belr. v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG 
MIN RENZI NO. 01817 (No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001) (China). 
 133. Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on Application 
of Minsk Automation Production Line United Corp. for Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment 
of the Supreme Econ. Tribunal of the Republic of Belarus (date unavailable). 
 134. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 [no official citation available]. 
 135. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Belr., art. 8, Jan. 11, 
1993, [no official citation available]. 
 136. See supra note 133. 
 137. See supra note 132. 
 138. See supra note 133. 
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though neither the Supreme People’s Court nor the Beijing No. 2 
Intermediate Court explained why the improper service constituted a 
breach of Chinese public policy. 
This issue was subsequently discussed in the Chorvanaslxizmat 
case.139 Similar to Minsk Automatic Production, the Uzbekistan summons 
and judgment were not served in compliance with the Sino-Uzbek 
bilateral treaty.140 As such, upon submission from the High Court of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Supreme People’s Court again 
utilized the public policy section of the Sino-Uzbek bilateral treaty141 to 
reject enforcement.142 Most importantly, the Supreme People’s Court 
explained that it was a breach of public policy since the failure of proper 
service constituted a breach of the judicial sovereignty of China.143 
It is submitted that the Supreme People’s Court has interpreted 
public policy too extensively in both cases. It can be recalled that in 
Section C improper procedure in an F1 proceeding is an established 
ground for refusal.144 However, the relevant articles in the bilateral 
treaties (including the bilateral treaties with Uzbekistan and Belarus) do 
not contain any requirement on improper service of judgment.145 Even if 
the Sino-Uzbek treaty did contain a requirement on the service of 
summons, it is explicitly governed by the law of F1 (Uzbekistan law).146 
Thus, it seems that the Supreme People’s Court felt compelled to utilize 
the public policy exception as a catch-all provision. 
However, this takes the public policy exception too far for a 
technical breach of procedure, and there are certainly alternative ways to 
reach the same result within the framework of the treaties. First, in both 
treaties, the articles containing the specified refusal grounds are not 
 
 139. Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on 
Chorvanaslxizmat case, Aug. 6, 2001 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 6, 2011) (China). 
 140. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., art. 3, Dec. 11, 
1997, [no official citation available]. 
 141. See id., art. 21(5)(providing for refusal of enforcement if the foreign judgment is in 
violation of F2’s “sovereignty, security and public order.” 
 142. See Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on 
Chorvanaslxizmat case, supra note 139. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra Section III(A)(3). 
 145. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140, 
art. 21 (3), [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, 
China-Belr. art. 21, Jan. 11, 1993, [no official citation available]. 
 146. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140, 
art. 21 (3)[no official citation available]. 
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described as exhaustive,147 and it is thus possible to reject enforcement on 
other grounds. The best way to handle this procedural irregularity is to 
reject the enforcement proceeding for failing to observe procedural law 
which is reserved by both bilateral treaties to be governed by F2 law (and 
in this case, Chinese law).148 When service of foreign judgment is not in 
compliance with the bilateral treaties, the service could only be legally 
effective if it is in compliance with the default Chinese law.149 When the 
service fails under the default Chinese procedural law, the foreign 
judgment can be rejected accordingly. This is no different from rejecting 
the enforcement of a foreign judgment based on the violation of a 
limitation period under Chinese procedural law.150 
Another case that was rejected on public policy grounds is 
Application of Li Yili for recognition and enforcement of foreign court 
judgment and civil ruling.151 It was a partially recognized/enforced case. 
The foreign judgment involved was an Italian judgment that held, inter 
alia, (1) that the couple was to be divorced, (2) the custody of the couple’s 
son and maintenance arrangement, (3) the distribution of real properties 
(both in Italy and China) and (4) the debt involving the couple’s car. 
When recognition and enforcement were sought in China, the court only 
agreed to recognize the divorce part of the judgment, but refused to 
enforce the latter parts. The reasoning provided by the court was that the 
latter parts of the Italian judgment were contrary to the public policy of 
China as they contravened the basic principles of the Chinese Marriage 
Law.152 
It is submitted again that the court in this case applied the public 
policy ground too lightly. Under each of the bilateral treaties (including 
the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty), the merits of the case cannot be opened 
by the F2 court.153 The governing law of divorce chosen under the conflict 
rules of F1 should be regarded as a substantive matter and should be 
 
 147. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140, 
art. 21 (3) [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, 
China-Belr., supra note 135, art. 21, [no official citation available]. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Minsk Automatic Production Corp. United v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG MIN RENZI NO. 01815 
(No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001) (China) (apparently, this is why the Hague Service Convention 
was discussed in the Minsk Automation Production case.) 
 150. See Supreme People’s Court, Interpretation of the SPC on the Application of the PRC 
Civil Procedure Law art. 547 (2015), www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/2649/3380/23 
(hereinafter 2015 Interpretation). 
 151. Application of Li Yili for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgment and 
Civil Ruling (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Jan. 21, 2010). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, art. 
25(2)  [no official citation available]. 
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recognized in the F2 court, unless it is so offensive as to violate the public 
policy of F2. It is also interesting to note that the public policy exception 
in the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty only refers to “sovereignty, security and 
public order,”154 but not “basic legal principles” as some other treaties 
do.155 
The non-divorce part of the judgment, while it might not be the kind 
of judgment awarded by a Chinese court under Chinese family law, does 
not appear to be an extreme type either. The real problem probably lies 
in the allocation of matrimonial property located in China under the 
Italian judgment. The court could have easily rejected the enforcement of 
this part of the judgment by utilizing the article in the Sino-Italian 
bilateral treaty that specifically reserves the exclusive jurisdictions of 
F2.156 Regarding the custody arrangement and the debt of the couple’s 
car, there is simply no indication in the judgment that they are offensive 
to the “sovereignty, security and public order” of China.157 The fact that 
the court did not cite the Sino-Italian treaty in the judgment seems to 
suggest that the court might not have been aware of the existence of the 
Italian Treaty.158 
Thus, having regard to the three public policy cases above, it is clear 
that the Chinese courts have overused the public policy ground as a basis 
of rejection unnecessarily. Instead, the Chinese courts should have 
utilized the more rule-based grounds to reach the same results. These 
cases therefore have done little to clarify the uncertainty involving public 
policy but have set up bad precedents for future cases. 
  
 
 154. See id., art. 21(6). 
 155. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cuba, supra note 105, 
art. 13, [no official citation available]. 
 156. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, at 
art. 22(2). For discussion on reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in bilateral treaties in general, see 
supra note 69. 
 157. Note that if there were no bilateral treaty, such arrangements included in a foreign divorce 
judgment will not generally be enforced under the Supreme People’s Court. Supreme People’s 
Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling Petition for 
Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra note 3. See further discussions 
in infra Section D(2)(iv). 
 158. See supra Section IV(1). 
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2. Ineffective Judgment 
Another ground for refusal that has been utilized in the court is 
ineffective judgment. In Schneider Electric SA v Xu Xiao-Xu,159 the 
Chinese court rejected enforcement by citing the lack of effectiveness of 
the French judgment under French law. It argued that since it was 
possible under French law to appeal the case, the judgment was therefore 
ineffective.160 However, this reasoning is problematic for various reasons. 
First, the judgment seems to suggest that the possibility of an appeal of 
the judgment equates to ineffectiveness. This is a very narrow reading of 
effectiveness and also does not fit with the literal meaning of the terms 
used in the Sino-French bilateral treaty. Under Article 22(3) of the treaty, 
a foreign judgment can be rejected if it is “not certain or 
unenforceable.”161 There was also no report of the defendant appealing 
the case in France; therefore, the appeal was no more than a possibility. 
If one adopts the Chinese court’s interpretation, a foreign judgment could 
only be effective if all the appellate processes in F1 have been exhausted. 
Such interpretation will have the effect of substantially restricting the 
applicability of the bilateral treaty. 
More importantly, Article 22(3) is expressly subject to French law. 
In the case, the judgment creditor actually submitted to the Chinese court 
a certification of effectiveness of judgment issued by the Paris appellate 
court. Although Article 22(3) falls short of saying that the French court’s 
determination of effectiveness is binding and conclusive, the French 
court’s certification appears to be the best proof one can get of the 
effectiveness of the French judgment under French law. It seems absurd 
that the Chinese court could just overrule such certification according to 
its own interpretation of French law, particularly when there was no 
record of an expert witness on French law in the judgment. Accordingly, 
the Schneider case is another bad precedent by the PRC court to reject 
enforcement of a foreign judgment. 
A better way to achieve the same result is to attack the enforcement 
request on the ground of improper service of judgment. The case actually 
pointed to the service of judgment and other required documents not 
meeting the requirements of the Sino-French bilateral treaty.162 This is 
similar to what happened in Chorvanaslxizmat and Minsk Automatic 
 
 159. Schneider Electric SA v. Xu Xiao-Xu, Chongqing No. 1 IPC, (2011), Yu Yi Zhong Fa 
Min Chu Zi No. 285. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Fr., art. 22(3), May 
4, 1987. 
 162. See id., art. 22(3). 
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Production (discussed above). Instead of utilizing public policy, the court 
in Schneider opted to reject the case on the grounds of ineffectiveness. 
The case would have been far better handled if the court had just rejected 
enforcement based on the judgment creditor’s failure to comply first with 
the service requirement under the Sino-French bilateral treaty,163 and then 
the default procedural rule on service under Chinese law.164 
3. Document Inconformity 
In Iras-engineering Ltd. v. Jiangsu Hengyuan Machinofacture 
Co.,Ltd. and Jiangsu Hengyuan International Engineering Group,165 the 
court rejected enforcement of the default judgment from Kazakhstan 
because the plaintiff failed to produce documentary proof that the 
defendant was properly summoned under Article 18(2) of the Sino-
Kazakh bilateral treaty in time.166 Document inconformity is not a 
specified ground of refusal under the treaty,167 but failure to observe the 
proper summoning of the defendant at the F1 proceeding is.168 When the 
treaty expressly requires the plaintiff to produce proof of proper 
summoning, the burden of proving this appears to lie with the plaintiff. 
Thus, the most appropriate way to handle the decision is to refuse 
enforcement based on improper procedure in F1 proceedings. While this 
decision is clearly better than the one handed down in Chorvanaslxizmat 
and Minsk Automatic Production, as the court did not try to force the 
decision into public policy, it clearly passed on an opportunity to apply 
the proper refusal ground.169 
4. Other Rejection Grounds 
This part covers rejection grounds that do not appear in Section C(b) 
above. In Re Petition of B&T Ceramic Group SRL for Recognition and 
Enforcement of the Judgment on Bankruptcy Rendered by the Italian 
 
 163. Id., art. 23(1). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Iras-engineering Ltd. v. Jiangsu Hengyuan Machinofacture Co., Ltd. & Jiangsu 
Hengyuan International Engineering Group, Mar. 28, 2012 (Yangzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 
12, 2012) (China). 
 166. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Kaz., art. 18(2), Jan. 
14, 1993, [no official citation available]. 
 167. See id., art 21. 
 168. See id., art 21(3). 
 169. It is also possible to adopt similar reasoning advanced above in discussion of 
Chorvanaslxizmat case and Minsk Automatic Production case, namely, failure to comply with 
treaty service requirement and also the default Chinese procedural law. 
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Court,170 a claimant sought to enforce an Italian insolvency judgment in 
China. While the court recognized the Italian insolvency judgment, it held 
that it could not enforce the judgment by transferring the shares of PRC 
assets to the liquidator because the shares had been transferred to a third 
party. 
Two points can be noted. First, the involvement of a third party 
interest is not a ground for rejection under the Sino-Italian bilateral 
treaty,171 and the court failed to refer to any provision for the want of third 
party protection. Second, the scope of the treaty only covers judgments 
on civil, criminal compensation, commercial, marriage and labor, but not 
bankruptcy or insolvency.172 While the Chinese court may be commended 
for being willing to consider enforcement of a foreign judgment that does 
not clearly fall into the specified scope of the treaty, this case again shows 
the difficulty of fitting a square peg into a round hole.173 
Two other cases were rejected on procedural grounds, though not 
expressly stated in the relevant bilateral treaties. In Wu Yonglin and Chen 
Alan v. Zhang Wencheng,174 and Tedelon Holding Group Co., Ltd. v. 
F.A.C.I.BDICORTESI&C.S.P.A.,175 the foreign judgments were rejected 
because enforcement proceedings were filed at the wrong venue in China 
and for failure to present the case for enforcement.176 While these refusal 
grounds are not expressly specified in the respective treaties,177 they do 
fit within the argument that China should be able to refuse enforcement 
of a judgment for failing Chinese procedural requirements. 
Finally, there is a high percentage of unexplained rejections. Five of 
these seven cases are partially recognized/enforced cases involving 
foreign divorce judgments which are similar to the Li Yili case.178 In these 
 
 170. Judgment on Bankruptcy Rendered by the Italian Court, Guangdong Province Foushan 
IPC, CLI.C.829134. 
 171. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, at 
art. 21 
 172. See id., arts. 1, 20. 
 173. For a general discussion of the difficulty of enforcing foreign bankruptcy judgment in 
China, See Emily Lee, Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Lee Matters between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 439 (2015). 
 174. Wu & Chen v. Zhang (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Aug. 22, 2012) (China) (The civil 
judgment of second instance of dispute over right to life, health and body on Aug. 1, 2012). 
 175. Tedelon Holding Group Co., Ltd. v. F.A.C.I.BDICORTESI & C.S.P.A., (Hangzhou 
Interm. People’s Ct. Apr. 22, 2014) (China). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Fr., supra note 
161, at art. 22; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, 
at art. 21. 
 178. Application of Li Yili for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgment and 
Civil Ruling, supra note 151. 
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five judgments, the Chinese courts simply stated that the foreign divorces 
decrees were recognized without reference to other parts of the judgments 
that required enforcement. The effect, therefore, is the same as the Li Yili 
case,179 but for the lack of express rejection and reasoning. Again, this 
might be attributed to a lack of understanding of the treaties.180 Under 
reciprocity enforcement, divorce cases are generally recognized, but the 
property distribution, custody, and maintenance parts of the foreign 
judgment will not be enforced.181 These cases might therefore have been 
wrongly decided because of a lack of awareness or understanding of the 
bilateral treaties. In any event, the Chinese courts should have specified 
the reason for rejection as they are generally required to do so under the 
bilateral treaties.182 
In short, the low success rate could be attributed to uncertainties 
resulting from the lack of understanding of the treaties by Chinese courts 
(both in scope and refusal grounds), and, particularly, the over-utilization 
of the public policy exception. Instead of clarifying the uncertainties 
discussed in Section D, examination of the cases actually shows further 
confusion. 
C. Treaties Are Ineffective in Enforcing Commercial Cases 
Table 17 - Type of Cases 
 General 
Commercial 
Marriage 
/ Family 
Insolvency IP Criminal 
Compensation 
Total 
No. of 
cases 
6 18 3 1 1 29 
% 21% 62% 10% 3% 3% 100% 
Success 
case 
2 12 1 0 0  
Success 
rate 
33% 33% 33% 0% 0%  
 
The majority of the cases are family cases, accounting for eighteen 
of the twenty-nine treaty cases. Considering one of the perceived 
functions of an enforcement treaty is to promote economic 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Two of these five cases did not refer to the relevant bilateral treaty. 
 181. See Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s 
Courts’ Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra 
note 3, art. 2. 
 182. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Rom., art. 22(2), 
Jan. 16, 1991, [no official citation available]. 
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developments,183 the small amount of commercial cases (eleven out of 
twenty-nine, combining general commercial, insolvency and IP) is 
disappointing. The success rate is also slightly lower than family cases 
(27% to 33%). Further, the Chinese courts have been willing to go beyond 
the expressly specified scopes of the treaties. Both IP and insolvency are 
not within the range of the scope of treaties set out in Table 4. While 
judicial creativity might be admirable, it does create further uncertainties 
on the scope of the treaties, as seen in the discussion on the B&T Ceramic 
Group case above. 
In summary, treaty cases are rare, especially regarding the trading 
volume of the thirty-three countries, as well as, in comparison to the 
reciprocity regime. This could be attributed to the Chinese courts’ lack of 
awareness of the treaties, the uncertainties in the treaties (both because of 
their drafting and subsequent interpretation by the courts), and the 
ineffectiveness in enforcing commercial judgments. Considering that the 
first bilateral treaty with France entered into force in 1987, the current 
stage of the bilateral treaties regime is disappointing. The next section 
explores whether China should be a signatory to the Hague Convention 
and if that will present an improvement. 
V. HAGUE CONVENTION 
Commentators have spent a disproportionate amount of time 
debating whether China should join the Hague Convention.184 Since the 
European Union, Mexico and Singapore have ratified the Convention, it 
has become effective.185 Its influence is only going to grow as soon as the 
United States, which has already signed the Convention, ratifies it.186 
However, whether to join the Convention is a much bigger question as it 
involves considering China’s whole enforcement regime, particularly the 
issue of reciprocity. The structure of the Convention can be compared to 
the existing bilateral treaties. This will shed light on whether the 
Convention is conceptually acceptable to China. 
 
 183. Twenty-seven of the thirty-three bilateral treaties expressly provided for enforcement of 
commercial judgments. In addition, foreign divorce judgments are generally recognized (though 
not enforced) by the Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling 
Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, and thus one can argue 
that the real value of the bilateral treaties is in the enforcement of commercial judgments. See 
Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling 
Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra note 3. 
 184. See Tu, supra note 8. 
 185. See Hague Convention of Private International Law, Status Table, Jun. 6, 2016, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98. 
 186. See id. 
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The Hague Convention is modeled on the Brussels Convention,187 
which facilitates enforcement of judgments through harmonizing the 
jurisdictional rules of member states.188 Due to the need to compromise 
the different views on the proper bases of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional 
ground of the final version of the Hague Convention is only limited to 
jurisdiction agreement, which makes it similar to the New York 
Convention.189 
Previously, some commentators compared the jurisdictional bases 
of the Hague Convention with the direct jurisdictional bases of China.190 
While this is certainly relevant, it will also be essential to compare the 
enforcement bases of China against its counterpart to the Hague 
Convention. 
The Hague Convention governs three different roles that a member 
state plays: (1) the court that is designated as the court with jurisdiction 
by the jurisdiction agreement,191 (2) the court that is not designated by the 
jurisdiction agreement but is where the proceeding is initiated,192 and (3) 
the court that is to enforce the judgment rendered by a court designated 
by the jurisdiction agreement.193 Since the bilateral treaties do not set out 
requirements on the first two roles, the last role is the most relevant for 
our purposes. The first two roles will only be briefly set out below. 
A. Role 1 – Court Designated by the Jurisdiction Agreement 
The basic jurisdictional requirement of the Hague Convention is 
found in Article 5(1) which provides that the court of a Contracting State 
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have 
jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that 
state.194 There is no question that a jurisdiction agreement can enable a 
PRC court to assume jurisdiction generally if it is designated as such by 
the agreement.195 However, the fact that the jurisdiction agreement could 
 
 187. See CHRISTOPHER CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 
2011), 183. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Tu, supra note 8. 
 191. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 5. 
 192. See id. art. 6. 
 193. See id. arts. 8, 9. 
 194. See id. art. 5. 
 195. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 531 (The parties to a dispute over a foreign-
related contract or any other right or interest in property may, by a written agreement, choose the 
foreign court at the place of domicile of the defendant, at the place where the contract is performed 
or signed, at the place of domicile of the plaintiff, at the place where the subject matter is located, 
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potentially be void under Chinese law196narrows the application of the 
Convention. This includes (a) only foreign related matters can have 
jurisdiction agreement,197 and foreign joint venture and wholly-owned 
foreign enterprises are not considered a foreign party; (b) the chosen 
jurisdiction must have an actual connection with the dispute;198 and (c) 
some matters are reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of China.199 While 
these matters could be excluded from the scope expressly pursuant to 
Article 21 of the Convention, it would substantially limit the 
effectiveness of the Convention.200 One commentator even called the 
exclusion mechanism of Article 21 a “Trojan Horse” in effect, “with the 
potential to reduce the Convention to a hollow shell.”201 
Further, under Article 5(2), a court designated by the jurisdictional 
agreement should not decline to exercise jurisdiction because the case 
should be decided in a court of another state. This will not be a problem 
to China even if it has now recognized the principle of forum non 
conveniens under Article 532 of the 2015 Interpretation.202 One of the 
conditions of its application, however, is the lack of an agreement 
specifying the jurisdiction of a court of the PRC.203 Accordingly, the 
restriction under Article 5(2) of The Hague Convention exists under 
current Chinese law. 
B. Role 2 – Court Not Designated by the Jurisdiction Agreement 
Unless expressly allowed under Article 6 of The Hague Convention, 
a court not designated by the jurisdiction agreement shall suspend or 
dismiss proceedings to which the jurisdiction agreement applies.204 This 
again involves forum non conveniens. Under Article 532 of the 2015 
Interpretation, China can theoretically decline such proceedings, but it is 
up to the Chinese court’s discretion after considering a list of factors, 
which does not include a jurisdiction agreement in favor of a foreign 
 
at the place where the infringement is conducted or at any other place actually connected to the 
dispute to have jurisdiction over the dispute.). 
 196. See id. (definition of “foreign related” matters); see 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, at 
art. 522. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 
21. 
 201. See Richard Garnett, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much 
Ado About Nothing?, 5(1) J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 161, 176 (2009). 
 202. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 532. 
 203. See id. art. 532(2). 
 204. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 6. 
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court.205 Thus, adjustments are required to meet the requirements under 
Article 6 of The Hague Convention. 
C. Role 3 – Court Requested to Enforce Judgment from Another 
Signatory 
This role is the most relevant to our discussion. The question is the 
extent to which the experience of the bilateral treaties provides a blueprint 
as a matter of legal framework for joining The Hague Convention. 
Throughout this section, treaty precedents will be used to compare the 
corresponding requirements under The Hague Convention. This is by no 
means to suggest that the relevant bilateral treaty provision is universal 
among the treaties, but simply an indicator that China has previously 
agreed to a similar arrangement. 
1. Jurisdictional Bases 
The enforcement provisions under The Hague Convention are found 
in Articles 8 and 9.206 Generally, a judgment given by a court chosen by 
the jurisdiction agreement shall be recognized and enforced in other 
Contracting States unless otherwise specified.207  
The question, therefore, is whether under the existing bilateral 
treaties, a jurisdiction agreement is an acceptable indirect jurisdictional 
basis.208 As mentioned in Table 8 and the accompanying discussions, 
there are three types of jurisdictional bases.209 The exclusive jurisdiction 
bases are the common thread among the three types of jurisdiction 
bases.210 For the Convention’s requirement on jurisdiction agreement to 
fit with the indirect jurisdictional bases of China’s bilateral treaties 
regime, the bottom line is that the exclusive jurisdiction bases of China 
must be expressly reserved under Article 21 from the Hague 
Convention.211 
In particular, for Type 1, exclusive jurisdiction, as long as the 
foreign judgment does not concern the exclusive jurisdiction of China, 
then it will be enforced. For Type 3, objective jurisdictional bases, the 
 
 205. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 532. 
 206. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, arts. 8 & 9. 
 207. See id., art. 8(1). 
 208. One commentator compares the direct jurisdictional basis under Chinese law with that of 
the Hague Convention. See Tu, supra note 8. However, since direct and indirect jurisdictional bases 
may be different under current Chinese law (Type 2 is the same, but not the other two types), it is 
more appropriate to compare the indirect jurisdiction bases instead. 
 209. See supra Table 8. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 21. 
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Chinese will enforce a judgment that is based on an express jurisdiction 
agreement. While there is no difference in exclusiveness under such 
treaties,212 it should not be a problem as the current requirement is broader 
than that of The Hague Convention. In addition, exclusiveness is 
presumed unless contrary intention is proved under The Hague 
Convention.213 This will further narrow the gap between the two regimes. 
For Type 2, respective jurisdiction, a foreign judgment will be 
enforced in China if its jurisdiction basis is acceptable under Chinese 
jurisdiction rules. Thus, the analysis will be the same as in Role 1 above. 
Apart from the exclusive jurisdictional bases, additional reservations will 
have to be made to exclude jurisdiction agreements such as (a) foreign-
related, and (b) substantial connection between the dispute and the 
designated court.214 That said, most foreign judgments that satisfy Article 
3 of The Hague Convention are expected to be able to meet this additional 
requirement in practice. In the end, China has certainly accepted different 
types of indirect jurisdiction (see Types 1 & 3); therefore, this should not 
be a main problem even if these extra reservations are not made under 
Article 21 of The Hague Convention. 
2. No Review on Merits 
Article 8(2) provides that F2 cannot review the merits of the foreign 
judgments, unless the judgment in question was given by default. Almost 
all bilateral treaties require that the Chinese courts cannot review the 
merits of the foreign judgment.215 In fact, no exception is made for a 
default judgment. Again, the existing enforcement regime under the 
bilateral treaties has been shown to be even more flexible on this point. 
3. Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment 
Under Article 8(3), a foreign judgment will be recognized only if it 
has effect in F1 and enforced only if it is enforceable in F1.216 As 
mentioned in Section C, the ineffectiveness of a foreign judgment is one 
of the common refusal grounds in bilateral treaties.217 While the 
 
 212. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74 
(providing that F1 court will have jurisdiction if the defendant has explicitly accept the jurisdiction 
thereof). 
 213. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 3(b). 
 214. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3. 
 215. The only exceptions are the bilateral treaties with Poland and Romania. 
 216. Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(3). 
 217. See supra Table 7. 
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formulations vary, the relevant clauses are always governed by F1 law 
which is the same as the requirement under Article 8(3).218 
4. Refusal Grounds 
Article 9 of The Hague Convention provides for a number of refusal 
grounds against the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.219 
In Article 9(a), enforcement may be refused if the jurisdiction agreement 
was null and void under the law of the state of the chosen court. Among 
the three types of jurisdiction bases, this does not appear to be a problem 
in Types 1 and 3. For Type 1, as long as it is not within the exclusive 
jurisdiction, there is no additional requirement on the jurisdiction 
agreement. For Type 3, most treaties opting for objective jurisdiction 
bases do not provide for which law governs the jurisdiction agreement 
and the governing law question remains unresolved.220 However, in the 
bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the UAE, satisfaction of the objective 
jurisdictional bases is expressly provided to be conclusively decided by 
F1 court.221 Thus, arguably, China could accept this rejection ground 
based on F1 law. Type 2 is more problematic. As mentioned above, this 
will have to make reference to Chinese law which may be different 
substantially from F1 law.222 This is, however, just one of the three types 
of jurisdiction. 
Article 9(b) provides that a party’s inability to conclude the 
agreement under the F2 law is a ground of rejection.223 This is not 
expressly provided for in the bilateral treaties. This restriction could 
arguably be present in bilateral treaties adopting Type 3 jurisdiction bases 
which could reject such an agreement for failing to have a valid 
jurisdiction agreement. Alternatively, an even worse possibility is to 
reject on the ground of public policy.224 However, the case must be really 
extreme to apply, such as if the agreement was entered into by a person 
without mental capacity. The PRC law on capacity is rather reasonable 
 
 218. See id. 
 219. This Article is expressed as “may be refused,” implying that F2 court could still 
enforce/recognize the foreign judgment in the appropriate case. This is similar to most of the treaties 
(three provide the conditions in positive manner). See supra note 51. 
 220. See Section C(B)(2). 
 221. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra note 77. 
 222. See discussion in supra Section D – Role 1. 
 223. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(b). 
 224. See discussion in supra Section III(B)(5). 
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and will only hold a contracting party incapable of entering into a contract 
if he or she lacks of mental capacity or is underage.225 
Article 9(c) rejects enforcement on improper procedure in F1 
proceedings.226 In particular, enforcement will be rejected if (i) the 
defendant was not notified of the document instituting the proceedings in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his 
defence, or (ii) it was notified to the defendant in F1 in a manner that is 
incompatible with fundamental principles of F2 concerning service of 
documents.227 This clause fits with most of the F1 procedural clauses in 
the bilateral treaties. As seen in Table 9, most bilateral treaties reject 
enforcement for lack of a proper summons under F1 law.228 A few of them 
will also reject enforcement for lack of an opportunity to arrange for a 
proper defence. It is noted, however, “no proper legal representative,” a 
rather common ground for rejection, is not a basis for rejection under the 
Hague Convention, although China has entered into bilateral treaties 
without such grounds.229 For (ii) above, this is not expressly provided for 
in the bilateral treaties. As mentioned in the discussion on 
Chorvanaslxizmat and Minsk Automatic Production, the Supreme 
People’s Court actually utilized the public policy ground to reject 
enforcement. Adopting the Hague Convention will therefore be an 
improvement as it will limit the occasions where public policy is utilized 
and limit the potential to be trampled on by the “unruly horse.” 
Article 9(d) rejects enforcement of a judgment that was obtained by 
fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.230 This, again, is not 
expressly provided for in the bilateral treaties nor discussed in any case. 
It has been suggested that fraud could be covered by public policy under 
the current enforcement regime in China.231 Thus, China should not have 
a problem with this ground of rejection. If China were to adopt the Hague 
Convention, fraud would become an express ground of rejection and the 
 
 225. See General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at Fourth 
Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) art. 11, 13 
(China). 
 226. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(c). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See supra Table 9. 
 229. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note 
54, art. 22(4) [no official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal 
Affairs, China-Laos, supra note 51, art. 21(3)[no official citation available], and Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cyprus, supra note 51, art. 25(3) [no official citation 
available]. 
 230. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(d). 
 231. See Zhang, supra note 78, 164-65 (“recourse to [the fraud] defense by Chinese courts in 
the course of the [recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments] in China is probably in the 
name of the public policy exception.”). 
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enforcement regime would be improved by reserving public policy for 
the really extreme cases. 
Article 9(e) provides a ground of refusal on the basis of F2’s public 
policy.232 This clause basically equates the public policy clauses of the 
bilateral treaties. It must be emphasized, however, that this ground is only 
limited to those cases where it would be manifestly incompatible with the 
public policy of F2, including situations where the specific proceedings 
leading to the judgment were incompatible with the fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness of that state. Thus, the Hague 
Convention has made an effort to limit the scope of application of the 
public policy ground. With the establishment of Articles 9(c)(ii) and 9(d) 
on separate grounds, this article is clearly narrower than those of the 
bilateral treaties. Adopting this format would therefore be an 
improvement on the current regime. 
Finally, Articles 9(f) and (g) reject enforcement in parallel 
proceedings.233 If the foreign judgment is inconsistent with (i) a judgment 
given in F2 in a dispute between the same parties, or (ii) an earlier 
judgment given in another state between the same parties on the same 
cause of action, enforcement would be rejected.234 As shown in Table 10, 
bilateral treaties usually cover both grounds, and, in fact, at times go 
beyond that to include cases where Chinese proceedings on the same 
matter between the parties have been initiated at the time of the request.235 
But China has clearly accepted these types of parallel proceedings 
provisions previously.236 
In the end, three observations can be made after comparing the 
Hague Convention with the bilateral treaties. First, the bilateral treaties 
have mostly covered all the grounds of enforcement and rejection 
contained in the Hague Convention. They are certainly not identical, but 
they can serve as precedents where China has agreed to similar 
arrangements. Second, even in cases where they are different, bilateral 
treaties’ grounds for rejection are generally more lenient. Thus, agreeing 
to the Hague Convention would not open the floodgates. The added 
restrictions in the Hague Convention also appear to be optional,237 so it 
would not substantially damage the Chinese court’s flexibility which it 
has enjoyed thus far. 
 
 232. See id. art. 9(e). 
 233. See id. art. 9(f)-(g). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra Table 10. 
 236. See bilateral treaties with France (art. 22(6)), Vietnam (art. 17(4)), UAE (art.21(6)), Egypt 
(art. 21(4)) and Brazil (art 23(4)-(5)). 
 237. See supra Section III(A)(1). 
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Finally, on public policy, the Hague Convention makes a number of 
possible public policy rejections into separate, bright-lined rejection 
grounds. This will have the effect of limiting the opportunity to utilize 
the public policy ground and give more certainty to the parties. 
In conclusion, the adoption of the Hague Convention will not be 
problematic from the perspective of the legal design, compared with the 
existing bilateral treaties. If anything, it will be an improvement, 
particularly regarding the design of the rejection ground on public policy. 
The legal design is, however, only one perspective for consideration by 
the Chinese government. The enforcement regime of China also involves 
reciprocity. Due consideration should also be paid to the comparison 
between China and other countries in terms of the number of judgments 
as well as the judgment amounts. Before this decision to join the Hague 
Convention is made, China will continue to enter into new bilateral 
treaties with her trading partners. In these negotiations, however, China 
should try to include more guidelines in the areas discussed in Section C. 
In particular, an explicit refusal ground on improper service under F2 law 
should be added to avoid reliance on the public policy exception in 
relevant cases. 
 
